United Nations S/2006/216

Security Council

Distr.: General
4 April 2006

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Letter dated 3 April 2006 from the Permanent Representative of Congo to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

In my capacity as the representative of the current Chairman of the African Union, I have the honour to transmit herewith a communiqué issued by the Peace and Security Council of the African Union on an open briefing session held in Addis Ababa on 30 March 2006, containing a declaration on the situation in the Central African Republic (see annex). I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Basile **Ikouebe**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of the Republic of the Congo to the United Nations
Representative of the Current Chairman of the African Union

06-29726 (E) 060406

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Annex to the letter dated 3 April 2006 from the Permanent Representative of Congo to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

(Original: English, French, Arabic)

DECLARATION ON THE SITUATION IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (CAR)

1. The Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU), at its open briefing session, held on 30 March 2006, noted the remarks made by the Commissioner for Peace and Security and the Special Envoy of the Chairperson of the Commission for CAR on the evolution of situation in the CAR, and received statements from the Representative of the Government of the Central African Republic, of the Office of the United Nations in the Central African Republic (BONUCA), the Representative of the Secretariat of Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) and the Command of the Multinational Force of CEMAC (FOMUC);

2. Council **notes with deep concern** the situation of insecurity in the north of the CAR and the serious consequences on the political situation in the country and on the life of the population in that part of the country, with several thousands of people already having left their settlements to seek refuge in the south of Chad;

3. Council **notes, also,** the efforts deployed by the Government of the Central African Republic to maintain security in Bangui and to promote security on the rest of the national territory;

4. Council **expresses its appreciation of** the continued support of the BONUCA to the Government of the Central African Republic and the efforts of the United Nations agencies aimed at the stabilization of the CAR, the strengthening of its capacities to deal with the situation, as well as the improvement of the living conditions of refugees and internally displaced persons;

5. Council **underlines** the obstacles facing the Government of the Central African Republic in its efforts to redress the socio-economic and security situation, obstacles that are a particular result of insufficient financial resources and inadequate international assistance;

6. Council further **notes, with satisfaction,** the multifaceted efforts deployed by CEMAC to bring about the stabilization and revitalization of the economy in the CAR and **appreciates**, in particular, the activities of FOMUC on the ground. In this regard, Council **welcomes** the cooperation between the AU, the European Union (EU) and the CEMAC, which has enabled the FOMUC to carry out its mission in the CAR. Council **calls** on the Commission of the African Union, the Central African Government, the BONUCA and the CEMAC to work together to find a lasting solution to the problem of the CAR;

7. Council **welcomes** the decision of the Chairperson of the Commission to dispatch a multidisciplinary mission of experts to the CAR to evaluate its needs and to make appropriate recommendations on the assistance that Member States and the AU could provide to the CAR, within a holistic programme of post-conflict reconstruction;

8. Council **reiterates** its appeal as contained in the Communiqué PSC/PR/Comm (XLIV) of the 44th Meeting of the PSC, held on 29 December 2005, to AU Member States, bilateral and multilateral partners of the CAR, to provide support towards the implementation of the recommendations of the experts and continue to provide the urgently needed aid for the reconstruction in the CAR.

United Nations A/ES-10/327-S/2006/217

General Assembly
Security Council

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General Assembly
Tenth emergency special session
Agenda item 5
Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory

Security Council
Sixty-first year

Letter dated 4 April 2006 from the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Enclosed please find a letter dated 4 April 2006 addressed to you by Mahmoud Zahhar, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Palestinian National Authority (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the present letter and its annex distributed as a document of the Security Council and of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 5.

(*Signed*) Riyad **Mansour**
Ambassador
Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations

06-29767 (E) 060406

Annex to the letter dated 4 April 2006 from the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: Arabic]

Palestinian National Authority
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Office of the Minister

4 April 2006

His Excellency Mr. Kofi Annan
Secretary-General of the United Nations

Sir,

I have the pleasure, at the outset of this, my first letter to you, to express to you our appreciation for your continuing efforts and tireless work towards firmly establishing the values of justice, equality and development and the preservation of international peace and security. It is also a pleasure for me to express, through you, our appreciation of the role of the United Nations, its bodies and its specialized agencies in offering the necessary support to the Palestinian people and the Palestinian National Authority. In this context, I wish to stress the importance of the role of the United Nations and its ongoing historical responsibility towards the Palestinian cause until a just and comprehensive solution is reached on all the issues, as well as your important and constructive role within the Quartet, aimed at putting an end to the Israeli occupation and the state of conflict and bringing about a just and comprehensive peace. Through this letter I appeal to you to seek within the Quartet the start of an earnest, constructive dialogue with the Palestinian National Authority and its new Government.

The new Palestinian Government has received its assignments, beginning its work on 30 March 2006, and I myself have been appointed to the post of Minister for Foreign Affairs. This Government came into being as a result of the exercise by the Palestinian people of their right to choose their Government by means of free and fair democratic elections, as witnessed by the United Nations and the entire world. We look to the international community to respect the democratic choice of the Palestinian people and to work with this Government towards strengthening that democratic trend and safeguarding political pluralism as we move towards peace and stability in the region.

We trust that you will work with the international community and within the Quartet to ensure that support for the Palestinian people and their institutions continues and that they are enabled to obtain their legitimate rights, including the right to establish an independent, fully sovereign State with Jerusalem as its capital and the rights of return and compensation of Palestinian refugees. We also hope that certain States will re-examine the premature stands and hasty decisions they have taken, especially with regard to withholding assistance and adopting a language of threats rather than dialogue. Here I wish to assure you that our Government is ready to engage in earnest, constructive dialogue and to work together with the United Nations and the various countries of the world towards strengthening international peace and security and achieving peace and stability in our own region, based on a just and comprehensive solution.

Mr. Secretary-General,

Israel, the occupying power, still continues to move forward with its illegal settlement policies, seizing land, attempting to annex it de facto, expanding settlements and even starting the implementation of what is known as the E1 plan, the purpose of which is the total expropriation of East Jerusalem and the division of the West Bank into bantustans isolated from one another. All this, together with recent Israeli steps to cut off the Palestinian Aghwar (Jordan valley area) and prevent its inhabitants from gaining access to their fields and the destruction of their homes in order to force them to leave, so as to be able to impose de facto annexation of the area, will definitively rule out any hope of achieving a settlement and peace based on a two-state solution.

Furthermore, the Israeli occupying forces continue their unremitting aggression against our people oppressed by the occupation, making excessive use of military force, as in the operations, during the past few days, of bombing and destruction of infrastructures and civilian and sports facilities, in which they twice targeted a football field in the Gaza Strip, employing warplanes and heavy artillery against areas with dense civilian populations. They also continue to pursue their policy of extrajudicial killing, imposing sieges and closures on many parts of the occupied Palestinian territory, refusing to pay moneys owing to us that are in their possession and turning military checkpoints at the entrances to towns in the West Bank into something more akin to international border-crossings. The blockade and closure of the Gaza Strip has created a tragic humanitarian situation that has led numerous international and humanitarian institutions to warn of a deterioration of the humanitarian situation owing to the blocking by the occupation authorities of the entry into the Gaza Strip of basic humanitarian supplies such as medicines and basic food-tuffs, including flour and milk for infants. Israel carries out these illegal measures before the eyes and ears of the world, with little concern for the grave violations of international law and international humanitarian law that they entail, as if it were a State above the law.

The international community is called on today to take urgent, tangible steps to put an end to these grave Israeli violations of international law; to exert pressure on Israel to abide by international law and, in particular, international humanitarian law; and to comply with international agreements and the advisory legal opinion of the International Court of Justice. We further call on the international community to reject unilateral measures and solutions, live up to its commitments and fulfil its duties, especially with regard to respect for and the ensuring of respect for, international humanitarian law in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, as stressed by the Security Council in numerous resolutions.

Mr. Secretary-General,

We believe ours is a just cause. We have faith in the ability of our people to hold out and to stand up to the military occupation of our land and the occupier's illegal measures. We also believe that the solution must be founded on justice and law, the only basis for security and stability in the region. The logic of using force and of attempting to impose faits accomplis is an unsound logic that is doomed to failure. It can only lead to more destruction and instability. We, like all the other peoples of the world, look forward to a life of peace and security, a life of dignity in which our people enjoy freedom and independence side by side with the rest of our neighbours in this sacred corner of the world.

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Security Council

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Monthly report of the Secretary-General on Darfur

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraphs 6, 13 and 16 of Security Council resolution 1556 (2004), paragraph 15 of resolution 1564 (2004), paragraph 17 of resolution 1574 (2004) and paragraph 12 of resolution 1590 (2005).

II. Insecurity in Darfur

2. A high level of violence persisted in Darfur during the month of March, with armed clashes reported between conflicting parties, including between different factions of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA). In Northern Darfur, for example, fighting was reported in Umm Sidir on 11 and 12 February between the Minni Minawi and Abdul Wahid factions of SLA. The SLA humanitarian coordinator, Suleiman Jammous, was detained by the Minawi faction but was later released, partly owing to the intervention of my Special Representative. In addition, a commander from the Abdul Wahid faction was killed and four commanders injured in Hashaba North after an attack by the Minni Minawi faction.

3. Tensions in Southern Darfur remain high and reports of inter-tribal clashes and militia attacks are on the rise. Armed tribesmen allegedly supported by Government forces attacked an SLA camp in Reel, close to Shearia, on 14 February. On the same day, SLA shot down a Government helicopter in nearby Arto, capturing a pilot. Internally displaced persons in Shearia informed the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) in February that they continued to be attacked by militias, with women being raped and killed near the main water points. The situation in Gereida also remains tense. On 16 February, armed tribesmen attacked several villages south-east of Gereida.

4. In Western Darfur, attacks on villages, violence in camps for internally displaced persons, the presence of Chadian armed groups and unabated harassment of populations at the hands of militias have led to further displacement of civilians, including of returnees. In the Jebel Marra area of Western Darfur, recent fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces and SLA has forced virtually the entire population of the town to flee. Heightened United Nations security restrictions, which have a negative impact on humanitarian access, remain in place in parts of Western Darfur.

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5. Banditry continued to be prominent in Southern Darfur and humanitarian and commercial convoys were targeted. In Northern Darfur, humanitarian convoys were subjected to several attacks on the Tawilla-Kabkabiya road.

6. Also in Northern Darfur, Government attacks on villages in the area of Haskanita were reported during the last week of February, forcing many inhabitants to flee their villages. Although casualties could not be confirmed, preliminary reports indicate that many villages have been affected by the fighting.

7. On 31 January, a Government helicopter was spotted in Tine, Northern Darfur, with the inscription "AMIS" on it, and a similar sighting was reported the same day in Zalingei, Western Darfur. On 7 February, shots were fired at a United Nations helicopter in the Jebel Marra area of Western Darfur.

8. During the reporting period, several demonstrations were held in Darfur against the publication in some European newspapers of cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad. On 2 February, students demonstrating in Nyala town threw stones at the compounds and staff of Danish and Norwegian non-governmental organizations. However, the demonstrations in the Sudan were largely peaceful compared to the protests witnessed in other countries.

III. Human rights and protection

9. Civilian populations in Darfur continued to suffer the brunt of the violence. In recent attacks on villages and internally displaced persons' settlements, civilians have been killed or injured while acts of gender-based violence remained all too common. Families have also been separated and many have seen their properties looted.

10. In Northern and Southern Darfur, all of the parties to the conflict have pursued a deliberate strategy of targeting civilians in an effort to stem alleged support for enemy groups. This has provoked further movements of populations, including from the Shearia, Mershing and Gereida areas of Southern Darfur. The increase in abuses and violations perpetrated against civilians has been compounded by the reduced capacity of international actors to contribute to their protection, as increased insecurity has severely curtailed safe access.

11. The African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) has taken a number of initiatives to help protect civilians, such as establishing firewood patrols in the town of Nertiti in Southern Darfur. I welcome these steps and encourage AMIS to take additional measures to effectively prevent and monitor ceasefire violations. This will contribute to the protection of civilians in situations such as those that occurred recently in Mershing, Shearia and Golo.

12. Children continue to be adversely affected by the volatile situation in Darfur and are often the victims of violent crimes, including sexual violence. In the area around Mornei camp in Western Darfur, nine cases of rape of children have been documented in the last two months. These attacks often occur when children are out farming, herding or collecting water and firewood. As many impoverished families rely on their children's labour to survive, it is not unusual for children to be alone and away from their families for much of the day.

13. There are also continuing reports of children being recruited into armed groups. A United Nations mission to Tawilla in Northern Darfur in February, for example, found that most boys over 15 were enlisted into the Abdul Wahid faction of SLA.

14. In February, national security organs continued to obstruct civil society groups in the exercise of their rights to freedom of expression and association. On 13 February, five members of a national non-governmental organization were arrested and subsequently released without charge during a workshop on human rights in Ed Daein town, Southern Darfur. On 20 February, in Western Darfur, the director of the same organization was summoned by national security personnel in Geneina for questioning about the organization's activities and funding sources.

15. From December 2005 to the present, UNMIS has documented six cases of local leaders being arrested for raising concerns about internally displaced persons or providing information to "foreigners". In three of the cases, charges were brought against the leaders in local courts. This has resulted in internally displaced persons being reluctant to share concerns with the international community for fear of reprisals. Harassment and arbitrary arrests of community leaders by police and national security personnel are contributing to a climate of intimidation in Southern and Western Darfur.

16. Civilians who share the same ethnicity as the rebel groups in Darfur continue to be targeted for arbitrary arrest and detention by national security organs. Detainees are arrested on suspicion of supporting the rebels and held for periods of up to five months without formal charge. Detainees interviewed during a visit to Ed Deain prison reported being subjected to torture or threats of torture during interrogation. Fair trial protections, including the right to be informed of criminal charges and to be brought to trial without undue delay, are enshrined as unconditional rights in the Interim National Constitution and cannot be suspended even in times of emergency.

17. My previous report (S/2006/148, para. 10) contained information on the death of a student in Western Darfur as the result of excessive use of force by members of the central reserve police. The alleged perpetrator of that crime is being brought to justice before the new Geneina Criminal Court for Crimes Committed in Darfur. On 15 February, the new Nyala Criminal Court began hearings against two members of border military intelligence for their alleged involvement in the Tama attacks of October 2005, in which 28 civilians were killed. However, I am concerned about the effectiveness of the investigation and prosecution of these alleged crimes since no witnesses have identified the accused as participants in the attack. It is also disappointing that committees established by the Government to investigate attacks in Tiwal (18 December 2005) and Mershing (21-25 January 2006) have so far not yielded any results.

18. Meetings of the Sub-Joint Implementation Mechanism on human rights and protection were held on 1 and 19 February. Issues discussed included the action plan for the elimination of violence against women, the recommendations adopted after the joint delegation visit to Mornei in Western Darfur, and access to detention facilities. With regard to gender-based violence, the Government of National Unity provided an updated list of clinics authorized to provide medical information to be used in criminal proceedings. UNMIS requested a letter from the Government to facilitate its full and unfettered access to detention facilities and a current list of

detainees in the custody of national security organs. UNMIS human rights officers in Southern Darfur have received access to national security detainees. I urge the Government to provide similar access in other regions as well.

IV. Humanitarian situation

19. Humanitarian organizations continue to operate under difficult security conditions, which have a negative impact on the general situation and hamper efficient delivery of assistance. Recent insecurity in Gereida, Mershing and Shearia in Southern Darfur, among other locations, has led to the displacement of tens of thousands of people.

20. Humanitarian access continues to be a major concern in Western Darfur. The area around and to the north of Geneina remain under United Nations security phase four restrictions. Only about 50 per cent of the affected populations in these areas are accessible to United Nations operations, forcing humanitarian organizations to rely on more expensive solutions for the delivery of humanitarian aid, including private contractors and helicopters. The situation is even worse in the Kulbus-Silea area and large parts of Jebel Marra, where there is no humanitarian presence at all, leaving some 300,000 vulnerable people without assistance.

21. Despite these major constraints, the humanitarian situation remains under control for now. As a result of the efforts of the aid community, the population in Darfur continues to be spared major epidemics and overall malnutrition rates remain stable. In January, the World Food Programme (WFP) delivered 36,000 tons of food to 2.1 million beneficiaries. However, WFP stocks in Darfur and supplies now on their way will only meet requirements until mid-April. Shortages of some non-cereal commodities will start at that time, and major pipeline breaks will begin in May, two months before the start of the hunger season.

22. There are some relatively positive indicators with regard to education: in December 2005, over 350,000 children were enrolled in primary school, more than ever before. The health sector, on the other hand, is facing an uphill struggle. The withdrawal of some non-governmental organizations from certain areas in Darfur, owing to insecurity and shortages in funding and staffing, has created a gap in service that needs to be tackled urgently. Access to primary health care has dropped in early 2006 compared to the situation prevailing in the latter part of 2005. The combination of increased insecurity and gaps in funding is affecting other sectors, particularly nutrition and the supply of non-food items, in a similar manner.

V. Darfur peace process

23. Slow progress continues to be made at the inter-Sudanese peace talks on Darfur in Abuja. The security arrangements commission, whose substantive discussions began almost a month after those on power- and wealth-sharing, is engaged in crucial talks that are proceeding at a fairly rapid pace.

24. Despite a slow start, discussions on enhancing the N'Djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement have touched on major issues such as strengthening the ceasefire mechanisms, protection of civilians and the disengagement, redeployment and disarmament of the main protagonists and their allies. The discussions

culminated on 12 March when the African Union-led mediation presented the parties with a draft enhanced humanitarian ceasefire agreement. The draft agreement builds on the N'Djamena Ceasefire of 8 April 2004 and the Abuja Protocol of 9 November 2004 and strengthens, in particular, the monitoring mechanisms associated with the ceasefire.

25. In the power-sharing commission, although the parties have all but exhausted discussion of the main agenda items, they have been unable to reach agreement on any of them. Among the major questions are whether Darfur should become a region or remain divided into three separate States; the inclusion of a Darfurian representative in the national presidency; the borders of Darfur; and percentages for Darfurian political participation, both at the Khartoum level and in national and local government institutions in general.

26. Regarding wealth-sharing, much has been agreed upon, but a number of issues remain under discussion. Among the outstanding issues are compensation for war victims by the Government (including whether this should be done on an individual or communal basis), and the national revenue to be transferred to Darfur.

VI. United Nations support to the African Union Mission in the Sudan

27. As of 20 March, AMIS had a total of 6,898 personnel in Darfur, comprising 715 military observers, 1,385 civilian police, 27 international civilian staff, 11 Ceasefire Commission personnel and a protection force of 4,760 troops. UNMIS continued to liaise closely with AMIS through regular contacts with the Khartoum-based head of AMIS and AMIS personnel in Darfur, and through periodic meetings between the United Nations Assistance Cell and the African Union Commission in Addis Ababa.

28. In February, the team leader of the United Nations Assistance Cell continued to serve as chief of staff of the Darfur Integrated Task Force. The meetings of the Task Force focused on security, logistics, planning issues and the way forward. The team leader also participated in the discussions on security arrangements at the Abuja peace talks.

VII. Observations

29. The recent escalation of fighting between the parties, together with deliberate attacks on towns, villages and displaced persons' settlements and acts of banditry, has forced thousands more civilians to flee their homes and exposed them to a wide range of abuses. In particular, I am alarmed by the reports of widespread human rights violations committed in Gereida, Mershing and Shearia in Southern Darfur, among other locations, which have led to the displacement of tens of thousands of people. The most serious problems relate to the continuation of attacks by militias on unarmed civilians. According to many African Union reports, these militias receive support from the army. The Government has denied this but the reports persist. The Government must take immediate action to reign in forces over which it has direct or indirect control. Unless these attacks are halted it will be very difficult, if not impossible, to reach a sustainable peace and ceasefire agreement.

30. I deplore the continuing insecurity, call on all parties to stop all attacks on civilian targets, and remind the Government of its unconditional duty to protect its citizens.

31. The violence will only end when the parties make a final and definitive commitment to negotiate a comprehensive peace agreement, rather than pursuing a military solution. In this regard, I welcome the remarks made by senior African Union officials on 12 March, which emphasized that the parties must sign the enhanced ceasefire or force the international community to conclude that they are not serious about making peace. Indeed, the presentation to the parties, by the African Union-led mediation, of a draft enhanced humanitarian ceasefire is a positive development and a critical step in achieving a settlement. At the same time, the parties should move quickly to conclude comprehensive ceasefire arrangements and commit themselves to full and immediate implementation of these agreements.

32. This will require that the parties engage in the talks with a greater spirit of compromise in order to overcome the remaining contentious issues in a timely manner and conclude a comprehensive peace agreement for Darfur without further delay. The fragile relationships within and between the movements, as well as with many of the commanders in the field, continue to pose a challenge to the process. The fractures within the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army in particular, leading to fighting between the two factions on the ground, are very worrisome. The weeks ahead will be critical as the core issues in the security arrangements commission are distilled. It is crucial for the movements to ensure that internal rivalries do not hamper progress at the talks.

33. The international community has a critical role to play during this make-or-break period. International engagement was clear at the series of high-level meetings convened by the European Union in Brussels on 8 March, which included the participation of both the African Union and the Government of the Sudan, and which focused on the importance of mobilizing support for efforts to end the crisis and alleviate suffering in Darfur as soon as possible.

34. Similarly, a group of like-minded States and organizations, by focusing their efforts, could have a considerable impact in promoting a peaceful conclusion to this conflict by supporting and pressuring the parties to engage fully and to honour all commitments.

35. With this in mind and on my behalf, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, convened a meeting of such a group of member States on 19 March 2006 to discuss the crisis in Darfur and the importance of international support for solutions to the crisis. It is my hope that a mechanism for sustained and cohesive international engagement in the Darfur crisis, including support for the African Union, will emerge from that discussion in the coming days or weeks. I note that the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland has expressed its intention to convene such a group, which will include United Nations participation, and I commend it for the initiative.

36. The violence plaguing Darfur stems in part from local conflicts over area-specific issues and is carried out by militias that are not part of the Abuja process. In addition to a political settlement to be reached in Abuja, community-based reconciliation processes are therefore urgently required to restore a degree of security at the local level and to permit the return of displaced persons to their

villages. These local reconciliation processes should be genuinely inclusive, engaging the participation of representatives of tribes and other local stakeholders freely selected by their respective constituencies. The United Nations stands ready to assist with such efforts, which could be launched even before the conclusion of a political agreement in Abuja. A series of local reconciliation efforts along these lines should pave the way for the wider Darfur-Darfur dialogue to be organized after the conclusion of the Abuja process. A broad and meaningful Darfur-Darfur dialogue was called for by the parties themselves during the fifth round of talks in July 2005.

37. The heightened violence in Western Darfur and the tenuous relationship between Chad and the Sudan continue to impinge negatively on the peace negotiations. While the agreement signed between Chad and the Sudan in Tripoli on 8 February was an encouraging development, much more needs to be done to reinforce this process. The follow-up meeting of the chiefs of general staff and directors of external security of the Sudan and Chad, held in Tripoli on 13 March 2006, requested that AMIS provide security for the observer posts to be established on Sudanese territory as part of the implementation of the Tripoli agreement, as well as medical, food, air transport, communication and training assistance to the observer teams, within the limits of available resources. While these proposals are being considered by the African Union, I urge the Governments of Chad and the Sudan to take concrete steps towards implementing the Tripoli agreement, with a view to normalizing relations and reducing tensions along their common border.

38. The international community and the Sudanese people are at a critical juncture in Darfur. As the people of the region continue to be victimized by violence, it is now more important than ever that every effort be made to protect them. In this context it is critical for AMIS, whose performance has been truly commendable, to be strengthened and receive all the support it needs to effectively fulfil its mandate.

39. In accordance with the Security Council's presidential statement of 3 February 2006 (S/PRST/2006/5) and its resolution 1663 (2006), the United Nations is moving forward expeditiously in preparing plans for a possible transition to a United Nations operation in Darfur. In this regard, I was encouraged by the decision adopted by the African Union Peace and Security Council on 12 January 2006, which supported a transition in principle, and the more recent 10 March decision of the Peace and Security Council reiterating its support, in principle, for transition.

40. At the same time, the Government of the Sudan and some African Union member States continue to have concerns regarding a transition. It will be essential to address these concerns as a matter of urgency and I am taking steps to do so. It is important to point out that those who dwell on the possible presence of non-African troops on Sudanese soil may be deliberately fuelling a misguided understanding of the peace objectives that a United Nations operation would have in Darfur.

41. It should also be underlined that the planning of next steps must be undertaken in partnership with the African Union. I have had extensive discussions on this matter with Alpha Oumar Konaré, Chairperson of the African Union Commission, and it will be important to maintain these close links as we move forward.

42. One critical, practical step in joint planning will be a technical assessment mission to Darfur, which should be a joint African Union/United Nations undertaking. For the assessment to be effective, the team will have to have full and

unrestricted access to the region, to Government officials, local players and to relevant information, in order to complete planning. There will also be a need for this assessment mission to travel to Chad to review the situation on that side of the border, in agreement with the Government of Chad. At some point, bilateral and multilateral donors to AMIS and other stakeholders should be associated with the transition process and planning.

43. In the meantime, stabilizing the humanitarian situation is an important task of the United Nations and its partners in Darfur. Nearly 14,200 dedicated national and international humanitarian workers continue to assist 3.6 million vulnerable people, about half of whom are displaced. These efforts have helped to stave off major epidemics, reduce malnutrition and alleviate the suffering of conflict-affected populations. However, mounting insecurity in Western Darfur has led to a situation where many United Nations humanitarian workers had to be withdrawn, hindering the delivery of life-saving assistance to vulnerable people in several areas. Should the situation deteriorate further, the gains made in 2005 may well be reversed. I therefore strongly appeal to the donor community to continue to support humanitarian efforts in Darfur.

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Security Council

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Letter dated 12 April 2006 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), established by the Security Council in its resolution 1279 (1999) of 30 November 1999.

As you are aware, a referendum on the draft constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Congo was held on 18 and 19 December 2005, with minimal security problems. The United Nations remains concerned, however, about the possibility of violence occurring before, during or after the upcoming elections, which neither the forces of MONUC nor the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo would have the capacity to contain. On 27 December 2005, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, sent a letter (see annex I) to Jack Straw, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, in his country's capacity as Presidency of the European Union, requesting the European Union to consider the possibility of making available a force reserve that, if necessary, could be deployed to the Democratic Republic of the Congo to support MONUC during the electoral process.

In response to that request, I have received a letter dated 28 March 2006 (see annex II), from Ursula Plassnik, Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Austria, on behalf of the Council of the European Union, conveying the willingness of the European Union to provide support to MONUC during the electoral period, subject to the authorization of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

I have also taken note of the letter dated 30 March from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the President of the Security Council (S/2006/203) conveying the support of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for the deployment of a reserve force of the European Union to assist MONUC during the electoral period.

I believe that the deployment of such a force would be an important contribution to the international community's efforts to support the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in ensuring the successful holding of elections under secure conditions in the country. I would therefore welcome its authorization by the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Kofi A. **Annan**

06-29868 (E) 130406

Annex I

[Original: English]

Letter dated 27 December 2005 from the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

In the context of strengthening collaboration between the United Nations and the European Union in the area of international peace and security, I am writing to suggest possible means through which the European Union could further contribute to the United Nations efforts to promote peace and stability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

As you are aware, under the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement concluded in December 2002, national elections are to be held in the Democratic Republic of Congo by the end of June 2006. As an important step in this direction, a referendum on the draft constitution was held on 18 and 19 December. While the results of the referendum have not yet been officially announced, preliminary indications suggest a "yes" vote on the draft constitution. Although the referendum took place with minimal security problems, the United Nations is nonetheless concerned about the possibility of violence occurring before, during or immediately after the elections, which neither the forces of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) nor the Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo would be able to contain.

The European Union, in partnership with the United Nations, has played an important role in helping the Congolese people to arrive at the historic juncture where they now stand. The deployment of Operation Artemis was a crucial factor in providing the basic degree of security necessary for the political process to begin, and the European Union's subsequent political, development and humanitarian engagement has been indispensable to permit further progress. This has included the provision of a police training mission, EUPOL Kinshasa, and, more recently, a mission to assist security sector reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The EU Special Representative, Aldo Ajello, is working closely with my staff in the field on a daily basis. At the same time, the European Union is leading donor support for the electoral process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and, together with the United Nations, is actively assisting the electoral bodies of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in their preparations.

The challenge we now face is to assist the Democratic Republic of the Congo to secure the substantial progress that has been made to date. I should be grateful if the European Union could consider the possibility of making available a deterrent force that, if necessary, could be deployed to the Democratic Republic of the Congo during the electoral process.

As outlined by the Assistant Secretary-General, Hédi Annabi, during the November meeting of the United Nations-EU Steering Committee, this contribution could take the form of a suitably earmarked force reserve that could enhance the quick reaction capabilities of MONUC during or immediately after the electoral process. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations stands ready to hold

consultations with the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, in Brussels or in New York, on the modalities for deployment of such a force, its location and the tasks it may be required to conduct. Following agreement on those modalities, the public articulation of such a commitment would help to ensure its deterrent effect, and would demonstrate our collective determination to prevent potential spoilers from undermining the peace process.

In view of the relatively short time available for the necessary planning and consultation to organize such a force, I should be most grateful if the European Union could give urgent consideration to this suggestion.

(*Signed*) Jean-Marie **Guéhenno**
Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations

Annex II

[Original: French]

Letter dated 28 March 2006 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Austria addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the pleasure of informing you that the Council of the European Union has decided to respond positively to the United Nations request dated 27 December concerning assistance to MONUC during the election period in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This support will take the form of a military operation conducted under the political control and strategic direction of the European Union and support measures conducted in particular through our police mission in Kinshasa. At this stage, it is expected that the decisions permitting the deployment of the force will be taken subsequently on the basis of a resolution of the United Nations Security Council.

1. The adoption of a United Nations Security Council resolution under Chapter VII is essential to enable the involvement of the European Union. Such a resolution must give a robust mandate to the European force and cover the members of the European force deployed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo during the operation itself, as well as during the disengagement phase. I would like to draw your attention to the urgency of this resolution, without which the Council of the European Union will be unable to take the necessary decisions to continue preparations for this operation.

This resolution should also provide a legal basis for the presence of European troops in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. To that end, it would be useful if a provision of the United Nations Security Council resolution could provide for the status of MONUC forces could also apply to the European force, thereby guaranteeing a status similar to that of the forces already in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. A key point of the resolution will be autonomy for the European Union in deciding on the use of force.

2. The objective of the military operation is to be able to provide support to MONUC in the event that it encounters serious difficulties which cannot be managed from its own resources. This should in no case cause the European force to replace MONUC or the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the execution of their tasks, in particular with regard to ensuring the general security of the election process. Support to MONUC would be provided in the following areas: limited extraction capacity, assistance in securing the Kinshasa airport, support to MONUC as needed in stabilizing a situation. I would also like to stress that the European force will not have the capacity to conduct major evacuation operations of nationals.

The advance troops predeployed will be concentrated in the capital, given that Kinshasa will be the political and strategic centre for the entire electoral process. The details will be specified during the forthcoming planning process. From technical contacts with experts from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, we have learned that the deployment of MONUC in certain locations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo territory will enable it to address certain potential difficulties without support from the European Union.

The precise modalities of deployment of the European force will also be specified during the operational planning process. In order to be able to respond to the requirement of speed in the execution of the mission, it is essential to plan for the deployment of troops in Kinshasa, with the remainder of the force remaining on alert outside the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

The deployment of the forces kept on alert outside the Democratic Republic of the Congo, should it occur, would be decided by the European Union, on the request of the United Nations Secretary-General or, if necessary, on its own initiative in close consultation with the United Nations.

The European Union is prepared to allow MONUC to benefit to the fullest extent possible from any information that might be gathered by the European force, according to the modalities to be defined.

The mission will be operated for a four-month period (mid-June to mid-October, assuming that the elections will be held on 18 June). The European Union will keep the United Nations informed on a regular basis on the progress of the operation.

3. The Congolese authorities have been consulted on the principal aspects of the planned operation. They have expressed their support and consent for the establishment of a European force. The European Union intends to continue to work in transparency and cooperation with the Congolese authorities in the forthcoming planning process as well as during the implementation phase. It will also keep the Governments of the neighbouring States and the African Union informed.

4. The preparatory work will be continuing in the weeks to come. It will be undertaken in close consultation with the United Nations Secretariat and with MONUC. Therefore, it would be appropriate to make arrangements for liaison between the secretariats and MONUC to ensure its effectiveness. These preparations should enable the identification of detailed modalities in accordance with which the European Union will perform this mission, as well as the support that the troops deployed in Kinshasa can receive from MONUC. I propose that, once these modalities are decided, they should be the subject of an exchange of letters between the Secretaries-General to formalize our agreement on the precise nature of the support that MONUC can expect from the European force.

5. The European Union also envisages a certain number of measures to accompany the military operation. In particular, we intend to reinforce temporarily the EUPOL police mission in Kinshasa in order to provide expertise in coordination of actions to maintain order. This reinforcement could begin as early as mid-May and will also end in mid-October. Third countries, African countries in particular, will be invited to contribute to this reinforcement.

I should be grateful if you could inform me as soon as possible, after such consultations as you may find necessary, if these general outlines are agreeable to you.

(*Signed*) Ursula **Plassnik**

United Nations A/ES-10/328–S/2006/220

General Assembly
Security Council

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General Assembly
Tenth emergency special session
Agenda item 5
Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory

Security Council
Sixty-first year

Identical letters dated 5 April 2006 from the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

In grave breach of international law, including international humanitarian law, Israel, the occupying Power, continues to use excessive and indiscriminate force and to launch military attacks against the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. In the period of just two days since my last letter to you, the occupying forces have killed at least two more Palestinian civilians, including a 15-year-old boy, and wounded dozens of others, including a mother and her 6-month-old baby.

Yesterday, Israeli occupying forces carried out air and artillery raids and attacks against the Gaza Strip. Using heavy military weaponry, including F-16 warplanes, the occupying forces fired missiles into the compound of the President of the Palestinian Authority and Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Mahmoud Abbas. The missiles landed at the President's helicopter landing pad about 100 metres from his office, leaving deep craters in the ground. President Abbas told reporters that the Israeli escalation is not justified and that Israel, the occupying Power "wants to sabotage the daily life of the Palestinian people and to fully destroy the institutions of the Palestinian National Authority and its security apparatuses, after partially destroying them all over the past five years". He concluded by stating, "the attacks were aimed at destruction for the sake of destruction".

The Israeli strikes also targeted three other sites in densely populated civilian areas in the Gaza Strip. As a result, at least one Palestinian was killed, and more than 10 were wounded, including a mother and her 6-month-old baby. The bloodshed and vast destruction of homes, roads and properties inflicted by the occupying forces in this already devastated area have caused widespread suffering, panic and fear to spread among the population and further deepened the severe humanitarian crisis being faced by the Palestinian people.

It must be highlighted that despite the warnings by United Nations aid organizations that the Gaza Strip is on the verge of a humanitarian disaster, the

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occupying Power continues with its policy of systematic closures, blockades and curfews, creating a shortage of the most basic medicine and food, including infant formula and powdered milk. An official from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat has confirmed that there has been no significant change in the situation and that the Gaza Strip is on the verge of facing a humanitarian crisis as bad as the one in Kosovo. Moreover, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) has warned of the unfolding humanitarian disaster caused by the Israeli closures of the Karni crossing, which has exponentially increased the number of starving people in Gaza.

Moreover, according to statistics of the World Bank, if there is no real change in the situation in the Gaza Strip 75 per cent of the residents will be blow the poverty line within two years. We call on the international community to compel Israel, the occupying Power, to halt its policy of starvation against the Palestinian people and immediately lift its blockade and allow food and medicine consignments to reach the tens of thousands of Palestinians in Gaza, which are intended not only for their well-being but also for their survival.

In another tragic event, on Monday, 3 April 2006, a 15-year-old Palestinian boy was shot dead by Israeli occupying forces near the Qalandiya refugee camp, west of Ramallah. Two other children were wounded in the incident. This is only one of many such horrific incidents where young Palestinian children have been killed by Israeli occupying forces. Since September 2000, more than 720 Palestinian children have been killed in cold blood by Israeli occupying forces.

It is starkly evident that it is the intention of Israel, the occupying Power, to cause as much death and destruction, both civilian and material, as possible in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, through its deliberate use of excessive, indiscriminate and completely disproportionate force against the occupied population. Indeed, in both word and action, the occupying Power has indicated that it will in fact continue with its aggression and its illegal policies, further compounding the suffering of the Palestinian people, who are already living in impoverished conditions under its brutal occupation.

The international community must take action to compel Israel, the occupying Power, to cease its military attacks and to scrupulously abide by international law, particularly the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem. Lack of firm action by the international community will only allow Israel to carry on with impunity its illegal policies and practices against the Palestinian civilian population, leading to even more death, injury and loss for the Palestinian people, further fomenting the vicious cycle of violence and further destabilizing this dangerous situation in the region.

This letter is in follow-up to our previous 237 letters to you regarding the ongoing crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, since 28 September 2000. Those letters, dated from 29 September 2000 (A/55/432-S/2000/921) to 3 April 2006 (A/ES-10/326-S/2006/213) constitute a basic record of the crimes committed by Israel, the occupying Power, against the Palestinian people since September 2000. For all of those war crimes, State terrorism and systematic human rights violations committed against the Palestinian people, Israel, the occupying Power, must be held accountable and the perpetrators must be brought to justice.

Accordingly, in follow-up to the above-mentioned letters, it is my profound regret to inform you that since our last letter to you, at least two more Palestinians have been killed by the Israeli occupying forces, raising the total number of martyrs killed since September 2000 to 3,803. (This number includes the names of four additional martyrs not listed in our last letter sent to you, dated 3 April 2006.) (The names of the martyrs that have been identified are listed in the annex to the present letter.)

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the present letter and its annex distributed as a document of the Security Council and the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 5.

(*Signed*) Riyad **Mansour**
Ambassador
Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations

Annex to the identical letters dated 5 April 2006 from the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Names of martyrs killed by the Israeli occupying forces in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem* (Friday, 24 March to Wednesday, 5 April 2006)

Friday, 24 March 2006

Hammad Hamdane Moslih (17 years old)

Monday, 27 March 2006

Samer Sobhi Farihate

Friday, 31 March 2006

1. Abdelkarim Al Koka
2. Ahmad Macharika

Tuesday, 4 April 2006

Mohammad Farid Zayyate (15 years old)

Wednesday, 5 April 2006

Abduallah Ismail Al-Daalseh

* The total number of Palestinian martyrs killed by the Israeli occupying forces since 28 Sep 2000 is 3,803.

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Security Council

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Letter dated 5 April 2006 addressed to the Secretary-General by the Permanent Representative of Tunisia to the United Nations

On instructions from my Government, and in response to your letter to the President of the Security Council dated 16 February 2006 and my letter dated 28 March 2006, I have the honour to transmit to you, attached, a letter addressed to you by Mr. Abdelwaheb Abdallah, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Tunisia, informing you in particular of the decision taken by Mr. Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, President of the Republic of Tunisia, to order the return to Kuwait of Kuwaiti property identified on board the Iraqi aircraft stationed in Tunisia, in view of a final settlement of the related matter with the cooperation of the United Nations (see annex).

I should be grateful if this letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Ali **Hachani**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Tunisia to the United Nations

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Annex to the letter dated 5 April 2006 addressed to the Secretary-General by the Permanent Representative of Tunisia to the United Nations

The Tunisian Government has been informed of your letter of 16 February 2006 addressed to the President of the Security Council transmitting a letter dated 15 February 2006 from Ambassador Yuli Vorontsov, United Nations High-Level Coordinator for issues concerning Kuwaiti prisoners and property.

As stressed in the report submitted by Mr. Vorontsov (S/2005/769), Tunisia has cooperated fully with the parties involved during the joint Kuwaiti-Iraqi mission of experts led by the High-Level Coordinator from 12 to 16 September 2005, during which a Kuwaiti aircraft engine and spare parts found aboard Iraqi aircraft were identified.

Deeply attached to the spirit of dialogue and to international law in the service of ever-improving international relations, and indicating his desire to arrive at a final settlement of the question of the Iraqi aircraft stationed in Tunisia, Mr. Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, President of the Republic of Tunisia, ordered the return to Kuwait of the Kuwaiti engine and replacement parts identified aboard those aircraft. The engine and parts in question are henceforth available to our brotherly country, Kuwait, which has already been informed of the decision of Tunisia through a special envoy of the Tunisian President to the Kuwaiti Head of State.

The return of the Kuwaiti replacement parts, and in particular, one of the engines, leaves unanswered for the moment the question of the return of the aircraft to their owner, Iraq, as well as the payment of the costs arising from their storage and maintenance in Tunisia.

Tunisia remains confident that, at a later stage, the United Nations will offer the cooperation necessary to facilitate the settlement of this issue in all its aspects.

(*Signed*) Abdelwaheb **Abdallah**

United Nations S/2006/222

Security Council

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11 April 2006

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Eighth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1603 (2005) of 3 June 2005, by which the Council requested me to keep it regularly informed of developments in Côte d'Ivoire, the implementation of the mandate of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) and of the Linas-Marcoussis and Pretoria Agreements. The present report covers developments since my report of 3 January 2006 (S/2006/2).

II. Political developments

2. In my last report, I informed the Council that Charles Konan Banny was appointed on 7 December 2005 as Prime Minister of Côte d'Ivoire for the transition period. On 28 December 2005, Prime Minister Banny appointed his 32-member Cabinet, which consists of all parties that are signatories to the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. The Cabinet includes two senior Ministers, namely, Guillaume Soro, the Secretary-General of the Forces nouvelles, who is in charge of reconstruction, and Antoine Bouabré of the Front populaire ivoirien (FPI), who is in charge of development; and five Forces nouvelles ministers, as well as two independent Ministers, of Defence and the Interior, respectively. Mr. Banny also assumes the functions of Minister of Economy and Finance, as well as of Communication. My Special Representative for Côte d'Ivoire, Pierre Schori, immediately started to work with the new Government, to which he handed over the road map for peace developed by the International Working Group.

3. While the appointment of the Cabinet was an encouraging step forward in the peace process in Côte d'Ivoire, this positive development was briefly overshadowed by the attack on military barracks in the Akouédo district of Abidjan by a group of armed persons on 2 January. Although the attack failed, it heightened the feeling of insecurity prevailing among the population, particularly in Abidjan, and further undermined confidence among the Ivorian parties. The Government's investigation is inconclusive.

4. From 15 to 20 January, the Young Patriots organized violent demonstrations in Abidjan and in western areas of the country ostensibly to protest against a communiqué issued by the International Working Group at its third meeting, held in

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Abidjan on 15 January, in which the Group noted that the mandate of the National Assembly, which had expired on 16 December 2005, should not be extended. The communiqué further called on the President, Laurent Gbagbo, and Prime Minister Banny to hold consultations on how best to make use of the experience of the parliamentarians who had served on the National Assembly to promote the peace process. The demonstrations proved to be a well-orchestrated action stemming from a deliberate falsification of the above-mentioned communiqué to the effect that the Group "had decided to dissolve the National Assembly in contravention of the country's sovereignty".

5. The demonstrations represented a breach of Security Council resolution 1643 (2005), as well as the Presidential decree of 12 December 2005 banning any street demonstrations. The virulent anti-United Nations propaganda and incitement to violence, especially on the Radio Télévision ivoirienne (RTI) and local radio networks, resulted in the extensive looting and destruction of assets and property of United Nations and humanitarian agencies in the western towns of Daloa and San-Pédro, and most seriously in Guiglo. The UNOCI headquarters in Abidjan, the French Embassy and the 43rd French marine infantry battalion were besieged and repeatedly attacked for several days by crowds of the Young Patriots. The situation was exacerbated by serious inflammatory statements, including by the Chairman of the ruling FPI party, Pascal Affi Nguessan. During the siege, United Nations property suffered extensive damage. In Guiglo, groups of people incited by hate media attacked UNOCI troops, forcing them to use their rules of engagement to ensure their own safety. Those same groups pillaged and burned the offices of humanitarian agencies and non-governmental organizations, while their staff were molested and chased from their houses, which were also vandalized. The direct threats to United Nations personnel led to a temporary relocation to safe havens of staff based in the west and in Abidjan.

6. On 18 January, the President of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo, the then Chairman of the African Union, visited Abidjan to help defuse the situation. As a result of that visit, President Gbagbo and President Obasanjo issued a joint communiqué, in which they called on all involved to cease violent action. The communiqué further called on the President and the Prime Minister to reach an agreement on the issue of the National Assembly. Following President Obasanjo's intervention, the demonstrations by the Young Patriots ceased.

7. On 27 January, on the basis of a recommendation made by the Constitutional Council on 15 December 2005, President Gbagbo signed a decree extending the mandate of the National Assembly. Opposition party leaders and the Forces nouvelles rejected the extension as a flagrant violation of the Constitution of Côte d'Ivoire and Security Council resolution 1633 (2005). From 9 to 16 February, the former Speaker of the National Assembly called for an extraordinary session of the Parliament to review the extension of the mandates of mayors. Only 102 of the 202 parliamentarians, primarily from FPI, attended the session, while most of the representatives from the opposition boycotted the meeting. The matter remains to be resolved, and current reports that another extraordinary session of the National Assembly might soon be convened may undermine the progress recently achieved and jeopardize the implementation of the next phases of the peace process.

8. During the whole period of the crisis, I stayed in close contact with main stakeholders, including the African Union and its new Chairman, President Sassou

Nguesso, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), President Obasanjo and the President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, as well as Prime Minister Banny. On 29 January, I issued a statement expressing my concern about the Presidential decree of 27 January on the National Assembly, noting that it did not appear to be in conformity with the information received from President Obasanjo and from UNOCI on the outcome of the visit of the President of Nigeria to Abidjan. On 1 February, in the light of continuing incitement to violence, I issued a further statement reminding the highest civilian and military authorities of Côte d'Ivoire, including President Gbagbo and the Chief of Staff, General Mangou, of their personal responsibility to prevent violence in the country, including attacks perpetrated against United Nations personnel and installations, as well as ethnic groups.

9. In spite of those setbacks, several important steps were taken, subsequently, by the Prime Minister, in close cooperation with UNOCI, to proceed with the implementation of the road map for peace drawn up by the International Working Group. From 9 to 11 February, at the initiative of the Prime Minister, the Government held a seminar in Yamoussoukro, which was attended by most of the Cabinet Ministers, including the Secretary-General of the Forces nouvelles, Guillaume Soro. The seminar agreed to establish monitoring mechanisms for the implementation of the key aspects of the road map, including disarmament, redeployment of State administration, identification of the population and conduct of elections.

10. On 17 February, the International Working Group held its fourth meeting in Abidjan. It congratulated the Prime Minister on his initiative to convene the Yamoussoukro seminar and the seminar's conclusions. The Group also welcomed the cooperation between the President and the Prime Minister and asked the Ivorian parties to proceed without delay with the disarmament and identification processes. It appealed to the parties to commit themselves to strictly comply with the ban on public demonstrations and to refrain from inflammatory statements or actions likely to exacerbate tensions. The Group also underlined the need to enhance the security of the personnel and equipment of RTI and to ensure its independence and the equitable access of all Ivorian parties to its broadcasts.

11. In keeping with a recommendation of the Yamoussoukro seminar, Prime Minister Banny convened a meeting of the main political leaders on 28 February. In attendance were President Gbagbo; the President of the Parti démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire, Henri Konan Bédié; the President of the Rassemblement des Républicains, Alassane Ouattara; and the Secretary-General of the Forces nouvelles, Guillaume Soro. This was the first gathering of these leaders in Côte d'Ivoire since the crisis began in September 2002. In a communiqué issued at the conclusion of the meeting, the Ivorian leaders reiterated their readiness to engage in constructive dialogue. They further observed that Security Council resolution 1633 (2005) did not contradict the Ivorian Constitution, and should be complied with in a constructive, consensual and coherent manner.

12. The communiqué also stressed that the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process should commence without further delay. With regard to identification and preparations for elections, the Ivorian leaders agreed that the two processes should begin simultaneously. They also emphasized the central role of RTI in reconciliation, as well as the need to ensure equitable access of all parties to

the RTI broadcasting facilities, noting the positive role of the media in the process. With the active participation of the High Representative for the elections, Antonio Monteiro, an agreement was also reached to ensure a balanced representation of political forces within the bureau of the Independent Electoral Commission, thereby ending a protracted political stalemate in the Commission, which had threatened to delay preparations for the elections.

13. On 14 March, Guillaume Soro arrived in Abidjan, after an absence of 16 months from the economic capital, with a security detail provided by UNOCI and Licorne. Upon his arrival, Mr. Soro had a meeting with President Gbagbo, after which he declared to the media that "the resumption of political dialogue will find its prolongation through military talks". This was the first meeting of President Gbagbo and Mr. Soro in Abidjan since September 2002; on 15 March, the latter participated, for the first time since the formation of the new Government, in a Cabinet meeting chaired by the President.

14. Furthermore, the International Working Group held its fifth meeting in Abidjan on 17 March. In a final communiqué, the Group welcomed the new spirit of dialogue among the Ivorian political class since the meeting held in Yamoussoukro on 28 February. The communiqué further urged the Independent Electoral Commission to ensure that the elections would be held no later than 31 October, as scheduled. At the same time, it expressed deep concern about the repeated obstruction to the freedom of movement of the impartial forces, in violation of resolution 1643 (2005), and strongly condemned the persistent violations of human rights, in particular attacks perpetrated against opposition Ministers.

15. On 25 March, the Prime Minister held consultations with the leaders of Senegal, Mali and Burkina Faso to brief them on developments in Côte d'Ivoire, and urged them to continue to support his Government's efforts to restore peace and stability.

16. The resumption of dialogue among the parties, the end of the protracted stalemate over the Independent Election Commission and the return of the Secretary-General of the Forces nouvelles to the Government are encouraging developments. These developments, if sustained, could put the peace process back on track. It is therefore crucial for UNOCI to be adequately equipped in a timely manner, so that it can fully support the implementation of the road map as it gathers pace.

17. The recent positive steps taken by the parties have eased tensions and improved the overall political atmosphere, which has created space for the redeployment of UNOCI troops and the resumption of humanitarian activities in the west. It has also allowed the Government to focus on other priority issues, such as the revitalization of the economy.

III. Security situation

18. As a result of the violent demonstrations organized by the Young Patriots, without any resistance on the part of the authorities and often with their silent abetting, from 15 to 20 January, the security situation in Côte d'Ivoire deteriorated sharply at the beginning of the year. There were serious obstructions to the freedom of movement of the impartial forces, interruption of socio-economic activities and

rampant insecurity in Abidjan, as well as in various parts of Government-controlled areas, particularly Guiglo, Daloa, San-Pédro and Yamoussoukro. In the western part of the country, the violent attacks, supported or allowed by the authorities, targeted at United Nations and humanitarian personnel led to the deaths of five rioters and the relocation of UNOCI camps from Guiglo, Toulépleu, Duékoué and Bloléquin to the zone of confidence. The growing insecurity and the temporary departure of UNOCI troops, under pressure and violence, from the western part of the country also forced United Nations agencies to relocate their personnel. This caused a dangerous security and humanitarian vacuum in those areas: nearly 14,000 internally displaced persons, refugees and ethnic minorities living there were left unprotected. Humanitarian activities came to a standstill as a result of the destruction by protesters of the offices of the United Nations and those of other humanitarian agencies, their relief supplies, warehouses, communications and other equipment. I have written to President Gbagbo requesting the Ivorian authorities to reimburse the United Nations for the resulting damage, estimated at $3.6 million. I am still awaiting a reply to that letter.

19. In order to minimize high security threats against UNOCI personnel during the January disturbances, the mission relocated 382 staff to the designated safe haven area in the region, using air assets from UNOCI and MONUC. The relocation, which began on 25 January was completed on 28 February, when the last group of staff returned to Abidjan.

20. In the meantime, UNOCI developed detailed plans to return to its former locations in the west. On 19 March, an advanced UNOCI joint military/police group was successfully deployed in Toulépleu and, on 28 March, an infantry company was deployed in Bloléquin. As part of the lessons learned from the January disturbances, personnel of formed police units are being deployed alongside the United Nations troops returning to the west, to ensure a crowd control capacity. The redeployment will subsequently cover Guiglo and Duékoué. UNOCI has engaged the Ivorian authorities at the highest levels, including President Gbagbo, Prime Minister Banny and General Mangou, to assist in facilitating the timely and smooth redeployment of United Nations personnel. The redeployment has nevertheless been hampered by the opposition of local authorities and some radical groups.

21. The security situation in the western part of the country remains highly volatile. Several incidents between Licorne and the National Armed Forces of Côte d'Ivoire (FANCI) occurred around the villages of Bouenneu and Zouan Hounien from 26 February to 2 March, in what appear to be deliberate attempts to obstruct Licorne's freedom of movement. On two occasions, armed FANCI soldiers infiltrated the zone of confidence at Bouenneu and harassed French soldiers maintaining the integrity of the zone. A French patrol escorting a FANCI team outside of the zone of confidence was threatened at gun point. Inhabitants of Bouenneu have reported that they were being harassed by FANCI elements who accuse them of supporting Licorne. After a rather prolonged and dangerous confrontation, a meeting between the UNOCI and Licorne Force Commanders and the FANCI Chief of Staff finally helped to defuse tensions.

22. On 7 February, the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1572 (2004) imposed targeted sanctions on two leaders of the Young Patriots, Charles Blé Goudé and Eugene Djué, as well as the Zone Commander of the Forces nouvelles in Korhogo, Fofié Kouakou. While the latter was not involved

in the events that affected Abidjan in mid-January, he was considered responsible for the recruitment of child soldiers, forced labour, arbitrary arrests and gross human rights abuses committed by forces under his control. In contrast to earlier threats to unleash a new wave of violence against United Nations personnel and property, the leaders of the Young Patriots called on their followers not to react.

23. In the meantime, UNOCI has continued to carry out its Security Council-mandated tasks. Energetic efforts continued to be made to promote confidence among various groups of the population and cooperation between the factions. UNOCI conducted robust mobile patrolling of the zone of confidence, with a view to preventing hostilities and enhancing the visibility of the Operation, including in remote areas. During the period under review, UNOCI also carried out 120 arms embargo inspections in both the Government and rebel-held areas, and is monitoring vital air and sea ports for any illegal transportation of arms and equipment. So far, there has been no indication of any major violation of the embargo. UNOCI has also recently recruited an arms embargo expert to strengthen the mission's capacity to carry out effective inspections.

24. At the same time, UNOCI has taken several measures to improve its state of preparedness to prevent or address future disturbances, and has placed special emphasis on enhancing the defence of all UNOCI compounds. A coordination and security team has been designated in each United Nations site in Abidjan to enhance command and control and coordination. Also, the layout at the Operation's headquarters in Abidjan has been fully reviewed to prepare for a better defence of the site.

25. In addition, UNOCI has established a security sub-office at Duékoué, which has the task of monitoring the activities of United Nations agencies in the Guiglo sector. The sub-office will also serve as a liaison body with the local military administrations of the Region of Moyen Cavally.

IV. Implementation of Security Council resolution 1633 (2005)

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

26. On 24 March, President Gbagbo appointed General Gaston Koné (PDCI) as Coordinator of the National Programme for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. The appointment was welcomed by the parties, who also expressed their readiness to advance the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process. In the meantime, the Programme is undergoing restructuring, in which it is envisaged that the Ministry of Defence will receive an additional role in this crucial area. However, the sequencing of the exercise is expected to remain as foreseen in the Yamoussoukro timetable signed on 9 July 2005 by FANCI and the Forces nouvelles. The chiefs of staff of FANCI and the Forces nouvelles, who met on 1 April in Yamoussoukro, are expected to agree shortly on the modalities for the commencement of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, which needs to start without delay.

27. The military and police tasks of UNOCI in direct support of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme will include securing of disarmament and cantonment sites; assuming security functions previously undertaken by the disarmed troops in the north, alongside 600 Ivorian security auxiliaries trained

earlier by UNOCI; escorting and/or providing transportation to former combatants in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration zones; responding to any disturbances in and around the camps, including riots and violent demonstrations; providing weapons control and destruction facilities; and ensuring a secure environment.

28. With regard to the financing of the programme, the Government must make urgent arrangements to clear its outstanding arrears to the World Bank, before the Bank will provide $80 million that it had committed for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. If the grant is indeed provided, the remaining gap for the programme will still amount to some $35 million, for which the Government pledged $18 million from its 2006 budget. The availability of secured resources from Government and donor sources, prior to launching the programme, would be highly preferable. The total cost of the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme is estimated at $150 million. In view of the complexity of the programme and its linkages to other crucial areas of the peace process, such as the disarmament and disbandment of militias and the reform of the armed forces, UNOCI and its international partners, as well as the donor community, should be prepared to provide the support it may require.

Disarmament and dismantling of militias and the restructuring of the army

29. In the meantime, UNOCI is providing technical assistance to the Office of the Prime Minister to work out a comprehensive approach to disarmament, which will include the disarmament and dismantling of militias and the restructuring of the army, once the restructuring of the National Programme is completed. The support of UNOCI will also include monitoring and/or ensuring the destruction or neutralization of the weapons surrendered by the militias, while providing the Government with assistance in responding to disturbances that might disrupt the process.

Redeployment of State administration

30. The Comité national de pilotage du redéploiement de l'administration, which has been restructured to increase its effectiveness, began its operations on 16 February, with UNOCI support. An estimated total of 24,400 civil servants were displaced during the conflict. So far, only about 6,000 have been redeployed in their areas of responsibility, mainly in the southern and western areas of the country under Government control. Some 20,000 civil servants need to be redeployed in areas currently under the control of the Forces nouvelles. UNOCI will be required to provide a secure environment for this process, which is expected to run in parallel with the identification and electoral registration. UNOCI has encouraged the Committee to begin a pilot project involving the redeployment of a small number of employees willing to return. Civil servants from the Ministry of Tourism and the Chamber of Trade returned to Bouaké in March. The continued redeployment will, however, require donor assistance because of the inability of the Government to provide all necessary funds.

31. In a positive development, discussions between the Government and the Forces nouvelles resulted in the conduct of school examinations in Forces nouvelles-controlled areas, for the first time in three years. From 27 February to 4 March, UNOCI provided logistical and transportation support and security

protection for 45 testing centres in sector east and 22 centres in sector west, while the European Union provided financial assistance and the United Nations agencies provided technical assistance. Almost 60,000 students sat for various school examinations, which are scheduled to be completed by 6 April.

Identification process

32. A working group on identification and elections established under the supervision of the Prime Minister produced a report early in March with specific recommendations aimed at facilitating the process and identifying potential difficulties. Its recommendation to conduct the identification process and the registration of voters simultaneously was endorsed by the Cabinet. However, since no judicial mechanisms exist in the north and in the zone of confidence, and given that many civil register records are missing, a considerable number of potential voters may not be able to obtain documents confirming their nationality or age and thus to prove their eligibility to vote. The modalities for the creation of mobile courts for this purpose are currently under consideration, to allow potential voters to be issued with new national identity cards or other legal identification papers. The process of identifying an estimated 12 million people over 13 years of age will be daunting.

33. Furthermore, there is still a divergence of views among the parties on the modalities of implementing the identification process, with some still calling for a general identification separate from the voter registration exercise. Some parties have also called for the United Nations to play a major role in guaranteeing the credibility, transparency and security of the identification process.

34. Moreover, as the issue of nationality and citizenship is at the heart of the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire, the identification period is likely to be extremely tense. In areas under the control of the Forces nouvelles, UNOCI must be prepared to provide security as State authority has yet to be extended in those areas. In some areas in the south, where ethnic tensions are high, UNOCI will also need to provide security if required.

Preparations for elections

35. Following intense negotiations led by the High Representative for the elections and the Prime Minister, the stalemate which prevented the Independent Electoral Commission from becoming operational since it was sworn into office on 17 October 2005 was resolved. On 16 February, the High Representative issued a communiqué confirming that the election of the Bureau of the Electoral Commission, which was held on 19 October 2005 but was contested by supporters of President Gbagbo, was in conformity with the Pretoria Agreement. On the basis of this determination, the key Ivorian leaders, meeting under the Prime Minister's auspices in Yamoussoukro on 28 February, agreed on proposals for the attribution of posts within the Bureau of the Commission to ensure a balanced representation of political forces. Following that agreement, the restructured Commission was formally inaugurated on 9 March. Since then, the Commission has been focused on a number of priority issues, and has benefited from UNOCI assistance. The electoral process remains fragile, however, and it is important that all Ivorian parties show restraint and maintain a constructive engagement in order to help consolidate the work of the Commission.

36. In accordance with its mandate, UNOCI will provide support for the organization of the elections, and, if adequately strengthened, contribute to the general security in main voting areas. UNOCI has already deployed electoral advisers to prepare for the establishment of the local branches of the Electoral Commission. In total, security should be ensured for 11,000 voter registration sites, the distribution and storage of electoral materials, and 18,000 polling stations. Security will also be needed during the pre-election campaign period. The new Chairman of the Commission has also recently requested UNOCI to provide security to the members of the Commission.

37. In my letter dated 3 November 2005 addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2005/707), I informed the Council that anticipated donor contributions to support the work of the High Representative for the elections in Côte d'Ivoire and his office had yet to materialize. Since then, the European Commission, France and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland have generously contributed, altogether, almost $1.2 million to a $3.6 million project established by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to provide the High Representative with office facilities, personnel, security and administrative services. These much-valued contributions will however be exhausted by the end of June 2006. If the budgetary shortage is not met by that time, it may become necessary to seek funding from assessed contributions.

Forum for National Dialogue

38. The Prime Minister has initiated consultations with all political leaders aimed at securing their agreement to hold a Forum for National Dialogue in the near future to help create a social and political climate conducive to the smooth implementation of the road map. The establishment of such a forum, provided for in the decision adopted by the Peace and Security Council of the African Union on 6 October 2005 in Addis Ababa (see S/2005/639) and Security Council resolution 1633 (2005), would be particularly important for further peace consolidation in the country.

Financing of the implementation of the road map

39. The Prime Minister's Office has agreed with UNOCI to establish a joint mechanism to prepare for a donor conference, following which a standing resource mobilization committee will be established to pursue fund-raising for the implementation of the road map. In addition, an economic forum, involving donors and the private sector, will be convened shortly to mobilize funds for national reconstruction.

V. Deployment of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire

Force deployment

40. As at 31 March, the overall force strength of UNOCI stood at 6,893 military personnel (see annex), against an authorized strength of 7,090. The shortfall is due to the lack of a much-needed military aviation unit, for which no firm offers have been made so far. Negotiations are however under way with Ghana, which could result in the deployment of such a unit early in May.

Police deployment

41. As at 31 March, the United Nations overall police strength stood at 696 police personnel, including three formed police units. Over 70 police personnel have been deployed to areas under the control of the Forces nouvelles to ensure security during the school examination period.

42. As a result of the January disturbances, United Nations police activities were suspended in Guiglo, San-Pédro and Daloa and police personnel were relocated. United Nations police personnel have since returned to San-Pédro, however.

43. As was indicated in paragraph 20 above, on the basis of lessons learned during the January disturbances, and to assist in addressing the security threats in Abidjan ahead of the fourth meeting of the International Working Group on 17 February, two sections of the formed police units based in Daloa and Bouaké were temporarily redeployed to Abidjan. The formed police units have proved to be effective in providing support for addressing civil disturbances in areas where they were deployed.

Security of the members of the transition Government

44. The UNOCI Sous-Groupement de Sécurité continues to provide security mainly to Ministers of the transition Government and signatories of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. While the national authorities are constantly reminded of their primary responsibility for guaranteeing the security of their citizens, these arrangements have contributed to enhancing the confidence and security of key personalities in the peace process. The workload of the unit has increased significantly since the return of Messrs. Bédié, Ouattara and Soro to Abidjan. UNOCI urgently needs reinforcements for the Sous-Groupement de Sécurité, in line with the recommendations made in my previous reports, as its resources are permanently overstretched and below established standards for close protection operations.

Reinforcements

45. Following the crisis of 15 to 20 January, in a letter dated 1 February addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2006/71), I recommended the emergency redeployment of one infantry battalion and one formed police unit from the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to UNOCI, on a temporary basis. By its resolution 1657 (2006), the Council approved the temporary redeployment of one mechanized infantry company, which was completed on 16 February. The arrival of the infantry company served as a timely deterrent, as it occurred on the eve of the fourth meeting of the International Working Group. The transfer of the company has also enhanced the response preparedness of UNOCI, in particular because of the considerable force multipliers, such as armoured personnel carriers and other assets, that the company brought to Abidjan. It is also assessed as having had an important stabilizing impact in Abidjan.

46. This reinforcement is limited and temporary, however, and an urgent decision on the reinforcements proposed in my report of 3 January is needed, especially in view of the decision to move the company back to UNMIL, which was implied in Council resolution 1667 (2006). The capacity of UNOCI to deal with the established timelines for the implementation of the road map and to curb further disturbances

needs to be considerably enhanced. There is still a serious risk of a sudden deterioration of the security situation, triggered by lack of progress in the peace process. It is essential, therefore, to ensure that the credibility of UNOCI and its role in the peace process is not challenged again, and that the Operation is fully equipped to effectively support the objectives set forth by Prime Minister Banny, which have to be achieved in a limited time frame. In this regard, my recommendations, initially expressed in my report of 3 January, to strengthen UNOCI by four battalions, three additional formed police units and 100 civilian police officers, with the commensurate increase in civilian staffing, to support this process and deter spoilers, are even more pressing. It is obvious that the situation in Côte d'Ivoire has important regional dimensions, and its deterioration would inevitably have negative security implications, affecting primarily Liberia and Sierra Leone, where hard-won stability is still fragile.

VI. Justice system

47. UNOCI continued to monitor the overall functioning, effectiveness and independence of the judiciary, and to provide the Ministry of Justice with comprehensive advice to help streamline the Ivorian justice system. That system is affected by many problems, such as political control, corruption, cronyism, nepotism, improper application of the laws and dependence on the executive branch.

48. Access to justice remains a problem, owing to the inadequacy of legal aid schemes and high court fees that are not affordable to the majority of the population. Overall, the general population distrusts the judiciary and the security forces, often preferring not to report crimes or avoiding judicial settlement of disputes whenever possible.

49. There is no functioning justice system in the north. Although UNOCI has helped to train 600 police personnel operating in the north, there are no functioning courts there. The Forces nouvelles have called on UNOCI and the international community to help rehabilitate the judicial system in the north and facilitate the return of judges, as part of the redeployment of State administration.

Prisons

50. The problems facing the prison system in Côte d'Ivoire include malnutrition, overcrowding and absence of health care, which has led to high mortality rates among inmates. The UNOCI prison monitoring programme has kept the prison administration informed of the situation in the prisons under their supervision, as they have no independent means of monitoring the institutions, for lack of transportation.

VII. Humanitarian situation

51. In the wake of the events of mid-January, the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and the Emergency Relief Coordinator, Jan Egeland, undertook a mission to Côte d'Ivoire from 14 to 17 February. During his meetings with Government authorities in Abidjan, militia groups in Guiglo and the leaders of the Force nouvelles in Bouaké, the Emergency Relief Coordinator reaffirmed the

neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian workers and condemned the destruction of humanitarian assets and the incitement to violence through hate media as violations of national and international law. He demanded that the Ivorian parties guarantee the security of all civilians, including humanitarian personnel. He also called for the perpetrators of violent acts against humanitarian personnel and civilians to be brought to justice.

52. The crisis of protection in Côte d'Ivoire is one of the greatest challenges facing the country. While the division of the country has spurred the rapid decline in the provision of health, education, water and sanitation and other basic services in the north, massive abuses against the civilian population, particularly minority groups, continue in the west. Following the evacuation of United Nations humanitarian workers from Guiglo, some 6,000 Liberian refugees, 7,000 internally displaced persons and 35,000 malnourished children, who had been receiving emergency school feeding, were left with limited access to humanitarian aid. Early in February, the World Food Programme and the International Organization of Migration, in collaboration with the non-governmental organizations remaining in the area, organized the delivery and distribution of one to two months' food rations to the most vulnerable populations. Meanwhile, a sensitization campaign was launched by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to promote the voluntary return of Liberian refugees, resulting in the assisted return, as at 14 March, of 14,564 Liberian refugees.

53. Pending the re-establishment of security in the area, United Nations agencies have set up temporary offices in Duékoué to oversee relief activities in Guiglo. In order to fund immediate life-saving operations, the Emergency Relief Coordinator has approved the disbursement of more than $950,600 from the newly established Central Emergency Response Fund.

54. As of March 2006, the United Nations Consolidated Appeal for Côte d'Ivoire had received only 2 per cent of the $40.5 million being sought. This severely limits the scope of much-needed humanitarian programmes in the sectors of health, education, water and sanitation, agriculture and food security, protection and human rights, education, coordination and security.

VIII. Human rights

55. Serious human rights violations continue to be committed in Côte d'Ivoire, mainly by elements of the Defence and Security Forces in the Government-controlled south, elements of the Forces nouvelles in the northern zone under their control, and militias on both sides of the Ivorian conflict. As in the past, human rights violations documented by UNOCI include summary executions, disappearances and death threats, rape and sexual exploitation, human trafficking, torture, and inhuman and degrading treatment, as well as interference with freedom of expression, freedom of movement and freedom of association.

56. Impunity continues to be a major contributing factor to the worsening human rights situation in Côte d'Ivoire. Repeated appeals by UNOCI and other international actors to civilian and military authorities to institute criminal proceedings against elements of the Defence and Security Forces in the south, and of the Forces nouvelles in the north, who have committed serious human rights violations, have remained unheeded. The imposition of sanctions by the Security

Council early in February against a commanding officer of the Forces nouvelles for human rights violations is a welcome signal to military and civilian leaders on both sides of the Ivorian crisis that they will henceforth be held personally accountable for serious human rights violations.

57. UNOCI continued to implement its human rights promotion programme, with funding from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. In a pilot phase, for which a grant of $25,000 was received, human rights training was conducted for a total of 250 representatives of Government departments, judicial services, local administrations and civil society organizations in Abidjan, Bouaké and Yamoussoukro. Within the same programme, human rights awareness-raising materials, including posters, pamphlets and T-shirts, were produced and distributed to more than 50,000 people in target communities. The Operation is also establishing a field presence in Bouna, Korhogo and Odienné, bringing to eight the number of UNOCI human rights regional offices in the country.

Child protection

58. The recent submission by the Forces nouvelles of an action plan to end the use of child soldiers, in accordance with Security Council resolution 1539 (2005), is an important and welcome step, which is the first of its kind in the experience of United Nations peacekeeping.

59. UNOCI and the non-governmental organization Save the Children have developed a joint training programme for all peacekeepers on basic child rights and protection. In addition, all UNOCI contingents have appointed focal points who receive training on the collection of objective information related to serious violations against children. UNOCI has also designed a database for the classification and management of reports received, which will be used for the transmission of reports to the Security Council Working Group on monitoring and reporting mechanisms established by resolution 1612 (2005).

IX. Media monitoring

60. Sections of the Ivorian media actively participated in propagating calls to violence and stirring up hatred during the attack in Abidjan on 2 January, the third meeting of the International Working Group on 15 January and the period before the imposition of sanctions. Those hate messages were directed mainly against UNOCI and the United Nations in general, the International Working Group, France, and selected local groups. The targets were portrayed as "threats to Côte d'Ivoire, its institutions and national sovereignty". They were sometimes presented as threatening the very existence of the Ivorian nation by being part of a plan to recolonize the country. In some instances, media reports directly appealed to racial sentiments.

61. Some local media also came under pressure during the January disturbances. In Daloa, the local radio station, Tchrato, was attacked and badly damaged. In Abidjan, Radio Télévision Ivoirienne was taken over by the Young Patriots, who used it to mobilize their supporters to attack UNOCI and Licorne. The Young Patriots destroyed the UNOCI transmitter in Guiglo and used the local radio to incite the population to attack the United Nations and non-governmental organizations.

62. In an effort to counter the incitement to hatred and violence in the media, UNOCI reinforced its communications strategy, with a view to developing a better understanding of its mandate and role in the peace process. UNOCI also made efforts to counter the disinformation campaign and to explain to the population the functions of the International Working Group, the implications of Security Council resolution 1633 (2006) and the imposition of sanctions. In addition, UNOCI has increased its contacts with RTI to help ensure that the recommendations of the meeting held on 28 February in Yamoussoukro are implemented.

63. During the period under review, UNOCI radio coverage was extended to the north-eastern town of Bouna and the central-eastern town of Daoukro, while a mobile broadcast van was fitted with a transmitter to allow it to accompany field missions to broadcast live reconciliation programmes and other activities. UNOCI FM broadcasts can now be heard in the main cities of the country. In addition, UNOCI launched three new radio programmes. The Operation's FM radio continues to be the sole source of reliable information for many Ivorians.

X. Gender mainstreaming

64. UNOCI gender-mainstreaming activities focused on sensitizing and preparing women to take an active role in the decision-making process, and promoting the rehabilitation of war-affected girls and women. The Gender Unit participated in the training of women candidates for the forthcoming elections, within the framework of long-term cooperation with the Coalition of Women Leaders, a major women's organization in Côte d'Ivoire.

65. In cooperation with UNDP, UNOCI is developing a project for the creation of a centre for women and girls who are the victims of gender-based violence. The centre will also promote capacity-building in human rights issues, women's participation in peace and electoral processes, and the prevention and control of HIV/AIDS and sexually transmitted diseases.

66. UNOCI also developed a plan of action for the sensitization of the local police and gendarmerie about gender issues and carried out various induction courses for military and civilian personnel. In addition, UNOCI is actively promoting gender mainstreaming activities in all areas of its work.

XI. HIV/AIDS

67. In accordance with Security Council resolution 1308 (2000), UNOCI continued to integrate HIV/AIDS awareness into its activities, while working with United Nations agencies. UNOCI conducted training of peer educators, voluntary confidential counselling and testing of the awareness-raising, as well as surveys of military and civilian personnel. The results of the surveys showed that, even though the knowledge level of the personnel on HIV/AIDS was acceptable, there were some attitudes and practices that exposed them to the risk of contracting HIV. These results have led to the review of HIV/AIDS awareness modules centred on those identified risk behaviours.

XII. Conduct and Discipline Team

68. UNOCI continues to cooperate with investigations by the Office of Internal Oversight Services into allegations of misconduct by UNOCI personnel. Ten such cases are currently under investigation. My Special Representative has also reviewed current policies on the off-duty activities of UNOCI staff, and made a number of recommendations on matters including restrictions on the movement of staff and vehicles, off-limit locations and staff obligations and responsibilities to prevent sexual exploitation and abuse. Efforts are also under way to review all of UNOCI policies related to conduct and to better inform staff members of United Nations directives on conduct issues.

69. In addition, with the assistance of the Integrated Mission Training Unit, the Conduct and Discipline Team continued to oversee the training of UNOCI personnel on the UNOCI code of conduct and raise awareness on the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse. In cooperation with the Office of Legal Affairs, training of UNOCI personnel continued during the period of relocation in Banjul.

XIII. Observations

70. Despite the serious setback resulting from the January violence in Abidjan and in the west of the country, some encouraging prospects for advancing the Ivorian peace process have emerged as a result of initiatives taken by Prime Minister Banny, with the support of President Gbagbo and other Ivorian leaders. I welcome the mechanisms for the implementation of the road map for peace which were set up during the Government seminar and the meeting of the Ivorian leaders held in Yamoussoukro on 9 to 11 and on 28 February, respectively.

71. In particular, at the Yamoussoukro meeting of 28 February, agreements on a number of outstanding issues were reached, including the disarmament and identification processes, the preparation of elections and the role of the media in the peace process. The Yamoussoukro meeting helped to resolve the serious crisis that had stalled the work of the Independent Electoral Commission since it was reconstituted in October 2005. At the same time, the smooth organization of school examinations in the north, for the first time in three years, represents a promising initial step towards the reunification of the country and the process of national reconciliation. These recent positive developments have eased tensions and improved the overall political climate, thus opening space for the Government to begin implementation of the road map and to pay attention to other priority issues, such as the revitalization of the economy.

72. Considerable challenges still lie ahead, however. The progress achieved so far can be sustained only if further concrete and dynamic action is taken to begin implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme and dismantling the militia, redeployment of State authority, identification and preparations for the elections. I urge the parties to agree without delay on the modalities for implementing the crucial identification process. The United Nations would be prepared to assist in the creation of a credible and transparent implementation process, if so requested by the parties, and if provided with the appropriate resources. As long as the militias and the Young Patriots remain mobilized, the security situation will remain fragile and potentially volatile. In the

meantime, the disarmament process, including disarmament of the militias, must start without delay.

73. The processes leading to the full implementation of the road map for the peace process are extremely complex, and will require the mobilization of significant resources, as well as the full adherence of the Ivorian parties to the principles and objectives laid down in the peace agreements and Security Council resolutions.

74. It should also be emphasized that the window of opportunity is very narrow, and time is running out. Any further delays or disruptions in the peace process will mean that there will not be sufficient time to complete all the critical tasks, if elections are to be held by October. It will, therefore, be important for the Council to send a strong signal to the parties that, if they fail to meet the October election deadline, the international community will not be in a position to simply once again agree to extend the current governance arrangements.

75. The January disturbances in the country have further emphasized the need to reinforce UNOCI operational capabilities to enable it not only to perform its original mandate more effectively, but also to perform the new challenging tasks ascribed by the road map. During the months ahead, the Operation will need to focus on curbing potential threats and helping to create a more secure environment to facilitate the implementation of key aspects of the peace process, including the provision of overall security, disarmament, the dismantling of the militias, the identification process, the extension of State administration and the preparation of the elections. All these tasks will now have to be carried out simultaneously and in an extremely compressed timeframe. The reinforcement of UNOCI from UNMIL authorized by the Council in February temporarily enhanced the Operation's response preparedness. However, the ability of UNOCI to address possible disturbances remains limited. In addition, some of the potential spoilers do not seem to have renounced their objectives. It is clear that there remains the potential for serious destabilization of the peace process and a rapid deterioration of the security situation cannot be ruled out. I wish once more to appeal to the Council to give positive consideration to my recommendations on reinforcement of UNOCI as contained in my report of 3 January and reiterated in my letter dated 22 March to the President of the Security Council (S/2006/184). There exists a serious risk that any unravelling of the security situation in Côte d'Ivoire could spill over into the subregion, particularly to Liberia.

76. The recent efforts of the Ivorian leaders to seek a peaceful settlement should also be translated into concrete measures to guarantee the freedom of movement and operations of UNOCI, Licorne and the humanitarian agencies and non-governmental organizations throughout the country. I wish to remind the national authorities of their responsibility for ensuring the security and freedom of movement of all international personnel operating in Côte d'Ivoire. Those committing attacks against the United Nations will be held personally accountable for their actions. There is also an urgent need to put an end to the culture of impunity in the country.

77. The dynamic partnership between regional leaders, including the African Union and ECOWAS, and the United Nations has proved essential to secure the parties' continued commitment to fulfil their obligations under the various peace agreements. I wish to commend the vital role played by President Obasanjo in helping to restore normalcy in the country in the wake of the January disturbances. I also acknowledge the important contributions being made by the new Chairman of

the African Union, President Sassou Nguesso, and the South African mediation. In order to maintain and consolidate the momentum generated recently towards the implementation of the road map, the international community should continue to demonstrate unity of action and purpose in dealing with Côte d'Ivoire.

78. In conclusion, I would like to commend my Special Representative, Pierre Schori, and the civilian and military staff of UNOCI for their efforts in support of the quest for sustainable peace in Côte d'Ivoire. I also wish to thank the High Representative for the elections, Antonio Monteiro, for his remarkable achievements in a difficult period. Mr. Monteiro relinquished his post last month. Similarly, I should like to express my gratitude to the United Nations country team, humanitarian and development organizations and bilateral donors, and regional and subregional organizations, for their major contribution to the peace process.

Annex

United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire: military and civilian police strength as at 31 March 2006

	Military component				
Country	*Military observers*	*Staff officers*	*Troops*	*Total*	*Formed police unit*
Argentina					
Bangladesh	10	12	3 474	3 496	125
Benin	9	6	304	319	
Bolivia	3			3	
Brazil	4	6		10	
Cameroon					
Canada					
Central African Republic					
Chad	3			3	
China	7			7	
Croatia	3			3	
Djibouti					
Dominican Republic	4			4	
Ecuador	2			2	
El Salvador	3			3	
France	2	15	171	188	
Guatemala	5			5	
Ghana	10	6	397	413	
Gambia	5	1		6	
Guinea	4			4	
India	8			8	
Ireland	2			2	
Jordan	7	12	200	219	250
Kenya	5	4		9	
Lebanon					
Madagascar					
Morocco	1	2	730	733	
Namibia	3			3	
Nepal	3			3	
Niger	6	1	364	371	
Nigeria	5			5	
Pakistan	11	5	364	380	
Paraguay	9	4		13	
Peru	3			3	

Country	Military component					Civilian police
	Military observers	Staff officers	Troops	Total	Formed police unit	
Poland	2			2		
Philippines	4	3		7		10
Republic of Moldova	4			4		
Romania	5			5		
Russian Federation	12			12		
Senegal	3	7	313	323		42
Serbia and Montenegro	3			3		
Togo	6	4	291	301		1
Tunisia	4	2		6		
Turkey						23
Uruguay	2	1		3		9
Uganda	2	2		4		
Vanuatu						4
Yemen	6			6		2
Zambia	2			2		
Total	**192**	**93**	**6 608**	**6 893**	**375**	**321**


UNOCI
Deployment as of
April 2006
CÔTE D'IVOIRE
MALI
BURKINA FASO
GUINEA
LIBERIA
GHANA
ATLANTIC OCEAN
Sikasso
Bobo Dioulasso
Orodara
Kadiana
Manankoro
Tingréla
Niéllé
Wangolodougou
Gaoua
Wa
Batié
Samatigila
Kouto
Ferkessédougou
Odienné
Sirana
Boundiali
Korhogo
Bouna
Sawla
Soukourala
Tafiré
Kokpingue
Bolé
Bania
Morondo
Niakaramandougou
Beyla
Touba
Kani
Séguéla
Dabakala
Nassian
Bondoukou
Sakassou
Sandégué
Samapa
Famienkro
Bouaké
Beoumi
Prikro
Berekum
Sucnvoire
Zuenoula
Gohitafla
Diebonoua
Kouassi Kouassikro
Mbahiakro
Man
Danané
Logouale
Kanzara
Daoukro
Bonoufla
Bouafle
Tiebissou
Goaso
Zouan-Hounien
Bangolo
Duékoué
Yamoussoukro
Zambakro
Abengourou
Bloléquin
Guiglo
Toulepleu
Gagnoa
Divo
Soubré
Lakota
Tiassalé
Zwedru
Tai
Pyne Town
Sikinssi
Aboisso
Bingerville
Dabou
Abidjan
Grand-Bassam
Newtown
Half Assini
Enchi
Nyaake
Grabo
Sassandra
Grand-Lahou
San-Pédro
Tabou
Harper
Zone of Confidence
Sector Boundary
Mission Headquarters
Sector Headquarters
Infantry Battalion
Infantry Company
Engineer Company
Signals Company
Transportation Company
Headquarters Company
Infantry Platoon
Riverine Section
Security Group
UN Military Observers Team
UN Military Observers Team (visiting)
The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
0 50 100 150 km
0 50 100 mi
Map No. 4220 Rev. 10 UNITED NATIONS
April 2006
Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Cartographic Section

United Nations S/2006/223

Security Council

Distr.: General
7 April 2006

Original: English

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling Security Council resolution 1581 (2005) of 18 January 2005,

Taking note of the letter to the President of the Security Council from the Secretary-General dated 27 March 2006,

Decides in response to the request of the Secretary-General to confirm that Judge Joaquín Canivell can continue to sit in the Krajišnik case beyond April 2006 and see the case through to its completion, notwithstanding the fact that the cumulative period of his service in the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia would then attain and exceed three years,

Decides to remain seized of the matter.

06-30365 (E) 100406

United Nations S/2006/224

Security Council

Distr.: General
7 April 2006
English
Original: French

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions and statements of its President relating to the situation in Burundi and in the Great Lakes region, in particular its resolution 1650 (2005) of 21 December 2005,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of Burundi, and recalling the importance of the principles of good-neighbourliness, non-interference and cooperation in the relations among States in the region,

Congratulating the people of Burundi for the successful conclusion of the transitional period and the peaceful transfer of authority to representative and democratically elected government and institutions,

Taking note of the letter of the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council dated 30 March 2006 (S/2006/206),

Recalling that the current mandates of the United Nations Mission in Burundi (ONUB) and of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) will expire respectively on 1 July 2006 and on 30 September 2006,

Noting that although there has been an improvement in the security situation since the completion of the transitional period, factors of instability remain in Burundi and in the Great Lakes region of Africa, which continue to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Decides* to authorize the Secretary-General to redeploy temporarily a maximum of one infantry battalion, a military hospital and up to 50 military observers from ONUB to MONUC, until 1 July 2006, according to resolution 1650 (2005), and with the intention to renew such authorization according to future decisions by the Security Council concerning the renewal of the mandates of ONUB and MONUC;

2. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

06-30377 (E) 100406

United Nations S/2006/225

Security Council

Distr.: General
7 April 2006

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General concerning the credentials of the alternate representatives of the United States of America on the Security Council

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received a note verbale dated 31 March 2006 from the representative of the United States Mission to the United Nations stating that Jackie Wolcott Sanders, Mark D. Wallace and Richard Terrell Miller have been appointed alternate representatives of the United States of America on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, that communication constitutes adequate provisional credentials.

06-30248 (E) 070406

United Nations A/ES-10/329-S/2006/226

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
10 April 2006

Original: English

General Assembly
Tenth emergency special session
Agenda item 5
Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory

Security Council
Sixty-first year

Identical letters dated 10 April 2006 from the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Over the past couple of days, Israel, the occupying Power, has been intensifying its military campaign against the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem. As a result of this latest escalation of its military campaign, the casualties and destruction being endured by the Palestinian people continue to mount dramatically. In this regard, it is my regret to inform you that since Friday, 7 April 2006, the Israeli occupying forces have killed at least 18 Palestinians, including a 6-year-old boy, and have injured scores more, many critically.

Since Friday, 7 April 2006, Israel, the occupying Power, has carried out a barrage of military attacks against the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, terrorizing the civilian population and causing more death and destruction. The latest attack occurred yesterday, Sunday, 9 April 2006, killing a Palestinian policeman when Israeli occupying forces shelled his car as he was evacuating colleagues from a security post in the border town of Beit Hanoun. On Saturday, 8 April 2006, two Palestinians were killed and a third was seriously wounded when a missile fired from an Israeli war plane destroyed their car in the densely populated Gaza Strip. Another extrajudicial execution was carried out that same day in the Gaza Strip, killing six more Palestinians. Several Palestinians were also wounded in the attack.

These two extrajudicial executions come on the heels of another extrajudicial execution carried out on Friday, 7 April 2006, in which Israel, the occupying Power, killed six more Palestinians in the southern Gaza Strip. In what has become common practice, Israeli war planes fired missiles at a car carrying the Palestinians and killed them all instantly, including a 6-year-old boy. In addition, dozens of Palestinians who were in the vicinity of the attack were wounded.

The occupying Power's continuation of its illegal policy of extrajudicial executions, which is in grave violation of international law, including international

06-30415 (E) 100406

humanitarian law, must be condemned by the international community and halted immediately. In this regard, urgent measures must be undertaken by the international community and halted immediately. In this regard, urgent measures must be undertaken by the international community to bring an end to these Israeli crimes and to stem this downward spiral of developments in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. The international community must intervene in order to avert more death, destruction and suffering being inflicted by Israel, the occupying Power, on the Palestinian people. The international community cannot continue to stand by idly while defenceless women, children and men continue to be killed, wounded and maimed and lives continue to be destroyed as Israel continues its blatant and flagrant violations and grave breaches of international law, including the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. In this regard, the Security Council, in particular, in upholding its duty to maintain international peace and security, should take action.

The present letter is in follow-up to our previous 238 letters to you regarding the ongoing crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, since 28 September 2000. Those letters, dated from 29 September 2000 (A/55/432-S/2000/921) to 5 April 2006 (A/ES-10/328-S/2006/220) constitute a basic record of the crimes committed by Israel, the occupying Power, against the Palestinian people since September 2000. For all of those war crimes, State terrorism and systematic human rights violations committed against the Palestinian people, Israel, the occupying Power, must be held accountable and the perpetrators must be brought to justice.

Accordingly, in follow-up to the above-mentioned letters, it is my profound regret to inform you that since our last letter to you, at least 18 more Palestinians have been killed by the Israeli occupying forces, raising the total number of martyrs killed since September 2000 to 3,821. (The names of the martyrs that have been identified are listed in the annex to the present letter.)

I would be grateful if you would arrange to have the present letter and its annex distributed as a document of the Security Council and the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 5.

(*Signed*) Riyad **Mansour**
Ambassador
Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations

Annex to the identical letters dated 10 April 2006 from the Permanent Observers of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Names of martyrs killed by the Israeli occupying forces in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem* (Friday, 7 April, to Sunday, 9 April 2006)

Friday, 7 April 2006

1. Wafa Ya'ish
2. Iyad Abu Al-Ainain
3. Bilal Iyad Abu Al-Ainain (6 years old)
4. Bassam Khalil Hussain
5. Adel Abdelkareem Shaath
6. Ibrahim Nafez Al-Aloul
7. Mahmoud Al-Tahrawi

Saturday, 8 April 2006

1. Hanifa Shobair
2. Ameen Barbakh
3. Mohammad Abu Al-Hossain
4. Hassan Abu Al-Hossain (21 years old)
5. Mohammad Samir Hamdan
6. Ibrahim Abdelhadi
7. Yasser Hassan Abu Jarad

Sunday, 9 April 2006

1. Sami Abu Shrei'ah
2. Mahmoud Ajjour (20 years old)
3. Jabr Al-Akhras
4. Sameh Nizar Al-Shaf'ei (17 years old)

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* The total number of Palestinian martyrs killed by the Israeli occupying forces since 28 September 2000 is 3,821.

United Nations S/2006/227

Security Council

Distr.: General
10 April 2006
English
Original: Arabic

Letter dated 10 April 2006 from the Permanent Representative of Bahrain to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

In my capacity as Chairman of the Arab Group for the month of April 2006, and on behalf of the States members of the League of Arab States, I have the honour to request an immediate meeting of the Security Council to consider the recent developments in occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem.

(*Signed*) Tawfeeq Ahmed **Almansoor**
Permanent Representative
Chairman of the Arab Group

06-30454 (E) 110406 110406

United Nations S/2006/228

Security Council

Distr.: General
10 April 2006

Original: English

Letter dated 10 April 2006 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

Pursuant to Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), I have the honour to convey the attached report on the international security presence in Kosovo covering the period from 1 to 28 February 2006 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would bring it to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Kofi A. **Annan**

06-30527 (E) 120406

Annex

Monthly report to the United Nations on the operations of the Kosovo force

1. This report covers the period from 1 to 28 February 2006.

2. As at 27 February 2006, the total number of troops in theatre was 16,083, which includes 2,741 troops from non-NATO countries.

3. Canada no longer contributes to the Kosovo Force (KFOR). The last participant departed in January 2006.

Security

4. Both the high unemployment rate and the poor economic situation continue to affect the daily life of Kosovo. Energy shortages remain a problem and there were demonstrations against the power company (KEK) last month. Future demonstrations are probable because of frustration over constant changes in plan schedules and availability. On 10 February 2006, a KEK tower in the vicinity of Strpce was damaged by the detonation of an explosive device. No injuries and no arrests have been reported. On 23 February 2006 a KEK plant in Obilic was highly damaged by flooding, and KEK had to alter its ABC plan accordingly.

5. The overall inter-ethnic situation in Kosovo remains fragile because of continuous alleged inter-ethnic incidents. No incidents were recorded against KFOR.

6. A total of 297 incidents relating to unexploded ordnance, illegal weapons possession, weapons and ammunition findings, drugs, human trafficking and counterfeit currency were reported during the past month. Weapons seizures made up the vast majority of incidents during the month. In the previous month 238 incidents were reported. This represents a 24 per cent increase in related incidents within one month and 70 percent within two months (175 related in December 2005).

7. KFOR continues operations to prevent ethnic violence and protect patrimonial sites, and remains vigilant to deter possible threats directed against international organizations and military bases. The force continues to improve its crowd and riot control capabilities in order to be better prepared to counter any resurgence in violence.

Compliance by the Federal Army of Serbia and Montenegro and the Ministry of Internal Affairs Special Police

8. During February 2006 10 cases of non-compliance were implemented.

Kosovo Protection Corps

9. The main focus for the KFOR Inspectorate for the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) in February 2006 has been the coordination and preparation of KFOR training of KPC and the evaluation of the Kosovo-wide roll call.

10. The KPC personnel establishment list includes 3,038 active members; 184 of them are minorities, of whom 46 are Serbs. That means that the percentage of

minorities in KPC is only 6.1. That is still far from the goal of 10 per cent, according to standard 8. At the moment, 20 slots on the personnel establishment list are empty.

11. Media training conducted in Multinational Brigade South-West was successful. KPC members were very resourceful in developing the scenarios and participated with much initiative.

12. The primary leadership development course for non-commissioned officers continues, with a planned graduation date in March 2006.

Conclusion

13. The overall situation in Kosovo will remain fragile, owing to recent events and ongoing status talks. The threat level against UNMIK and other international community facilities remains medium, and the threat level for KFOR is low.